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NOTES

Polish Communications Law:
Telecommunications Takes Off in
Transition Countries But at What
Price Are They Becoming Wired?
ABSTRACT

Internationally, the urge to expand and improve
telecommunications services is spreading.
Transition
countries, attempting the leap from Third World status to
becoming world leaders, have caught the fever and have
attempted
to
reform
their
regulations governing
telecommunications. In large part these laws have induced
slow liberalization of the communications sector with an
intrusive regulatory agency guarding every step taken
towards privatization. The World Trade Organization's
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) encourages
transition countries to use privatizationas a way to increase
funding for communications equipment. Many transition
countries signed the GATS agreementin the hope of attracting
internationalcapital, while they slowly reform their domestic
communications laws.
Poland, a signatory to the GATS agreement, is slowly
refocusing its domestic communications law to allow some
privatization. This Note examines the liberalization of the
basic telecommunications sector in Poland and the role of
GATS in this process. It includes a comparison of the legal
reforms in Poland to those of other Eastern European
countries. It also suggests ways in which transitional
countries such as Poland can keep some domestic control
over their telecommunications sectors, while continuing to
comply with GATS objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Spurred on by advances in telecommunications technology,
the international arena has attempted to expand growth in
communications.
The need for an efficient,
modern
telecommunications sector is now regarded as crucial to
economic development in transition countries.1
The basic
telecommunications industry2 comprises a vast portion of the
world's economy. 3 The development of new technologies has
increased the need to communicate internationally, to spread
new ideas and new technologies, and to stay competitive with the
growth of new telecommunications technologies in domestic
spheres. Government agencies, the institutions responsible for
telecommunications regulation, and Transnational Corporations
(TNCs), which have traditionally supplied most transitional
countries with equipment and technology, have largely dealt with
problems
of technology
transfer
and
local
industrial
development. 4 Recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
entered the equation with the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS)s specifications on international communications
policy. These new regulations show an international commitment
to privatization from those Member 6 countries participating in the
negotiations. However, this commitment poses unique problems
for transition countries.

1.
See Michael Hobday, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
THE CHALLENGE FROM BRAZIL 1 (1990); see also Join Kruse, InstitutionalOptionsfor
Eastern European Telecommunications Policy, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAKE-OFF IN
TRANSITION COUNTRIES 7 (Karl-Emst Schenk et al. eds., 1997) (defining "transition
countries" as those countries that are in the latter stages of transition from a

centrally-planned economic system to a market system).
2.
See John H. Harwood II et al., Competition in International
Telecommunications Services, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 875 n.3 (1997) (defining
basic telecommunications services as "the unmodified transmission of voice or
other basic data.") For example, phone service is a basic telecommunications

service.
3.
See Bjorn Wellenious, Telecommunications in Developing Countries, 21
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 33 (Sept. 1984); see also BEN A. PETRAZZINI, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2 (1995) (stating that
the telecommunications industry had the second highest market value, after
banking, in the world economy in 1993).
4.
See HOBDAY, supranote 1, at 1.

5.
I am referring not only to the GATS agreement itself but also to the
Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the
Telecommunications Annex to the GATS agreement.
6.
'Member" refers to a Member of the WTO.
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Issues such as equity, public participation, economic and
power distribution, welfare benefits, social accountability, and the
protection of national, cultural, political, and personal
sovereignty come into play when discussing the effects of
increased access to public telecommunications.
TNCs have
become the major suppliers of increased telecommunications
technology in developing countries; therefore, these companies
seem to gain the most from the WTO's commitment to freer trade
in the GATS agreement. 7 Developing countries such as Poland
need to structure domestic telecommunications laws to take
advantage of the Basic Telecommunications Act's 5(g) exception
that a developing country may "place reasonable restrictions on
access to and public use of public telecommunication transport
networks and services necessary to strengthen its domestic
telecommunications infrastructure and service capacity and to
increase
its
participation" s in
international
trade
in
telecommunications services.
This Note examines the liberalization of the basic
telecommunications sector in Poland and the role of GATS in this
process. Part II explains the provisions of GATS as they provide a
mechanism for multilateral liberalization efforts. Part III presents
a description of the reforms taking place in the Polish telecom
regime and how these reforms fit in with Poland's obligation to
comply with GATS objectives. Part IV compares the privatization
of telecommunications in Poland with developments in other
Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic, a
country that has been slower to privatize its communications
industries. A discussion of how Transnational Corporations have
effected the move toward privatization follows in Part V. Part VI
posits the ways in which transitional countries, such as Poland,
can keep some domestic control over their telecommunications
sectors, while continuing to comply with GATS objectives. One
possible way to achieve privatization without loss of domestic
control is through domestic infrastructure reforms. This gain in
domestic control can be accomplished without subrogating the
effort to achieve privatization or moving backward toward a
government monopoly. Finally, Part VII concludes that a more

7.
See, e.g., PETRAZZINI, supra note 3, at 4. For purposes of this Note,
"developing countries" refers to "a country that is not as economically or politically
advanced as the main industrial powers." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (7th ed.
1999).

8.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex on
Telecommunications, 5(g), 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1195 [hereinafter GATS]. The Annex
on Telecommunications is also referred to as the "Basic Telecommunications Act."
See id.
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efficient telecommunications sector would better serve Polish
interests, while continuing to comply with GATS.

II. GATS

AS A MECHANISM FOR MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS

In February of 1997, sixty-nine governments formed a farreaching agreement on a series of market-access commitments in
the basic telecommunications sector within the framework of
GATS. 9 The purpose of the GATS agreement is to "facilitate the
increasing participation of developing countries in trade in
services and . .. [to strengthen] their domestic services capacity
and its efficiency and competitiveness."' 0 The agreement takes a
wide view of what constitutes trade and defines "trade in services"
as the supply of a service through any of four modes."
Modes
One and Three identify the telecommunications sector as a "trade
in service."' 2 Mode One deals with the cross-border supply of a
service. 13 International phone calls fall into this category. Mode
Three "entails the commercial presence of a supplier of one
Member in the jurisdiction of another Member." 1 4 This includes
foreign direct investment in telecommunications services.' 5
Once GATS defined telecommunications markets as "trade in
services," the negotiating Members established basic commitments
6
to one another, as well as terms and conditions of market access.'
Three documents are crucial in interpreting the GATS objectives in
relation to its bearing on the telecommunications sectors of Member
countries: the Annex on Telecommunications, the Fourth Protocol
on Basic Communications (Fourth Protocol), and the Reference
Paper on Regulatory Principles (Reference Paper).

9.
See PATRICK Low & AADITYA MATrOO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
REFORM IN BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS: THE ASIAN

EXPERIENCE 2 (World Trade Organization Staff Working Paper No. ERAD9801.WPF,
Feb. 1998).
10.
GATS, supranote 8, at 1168.
11.
LOw & MATTOO, supranote 9, at 3.
12.
Mode Two involves consumption abroad; some Members have included
calling card services in Mode Two. Id. Mode Four covers "movement of natural
persons from one jurisdiction to another." Id. Mode Four relates to the movement
of telecommunications service suppliers and employees. Id.
13.
See Ud.
14.
Id.

15.

See id.

16.

Id.
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A. The Annex on Telecommunications
The drafters of the GATS agreement included an Annex on
telecommunications issues in order to make it clear that "[e]ach
Member shall ensure that any service supplier of any other
Member is accorded access to and use of telecommunications
transport networks and services on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions." 17 This obligation includes
ensuring that a supplier is permitted to lease or purchase
equipment,
which
interfaces
with
the
Member's
telecommunications network in order to provide the supplier's
services, 1 8 to interconnect private leased or owned circuits with
public telecommunications' transport networks, 19 and to use the
supplier's own operating protocols. 20 These provisions illustrate
the WTO's "freer access" policy favoring the opening of
telecommunications services.
The GATS Annex on Telecommunications also contains a list
of limitations on the rights of suppliers to free access of Member
5(d)-(g).2 1
States' telecommunications networks in GATS
Section 5(g) specifically adds protection for developing countries,
allowing a developing country to "place reasonable conditions 22
on access to and use of public telecommunications transport
networks and services necessary to strengthen its domestic
telecommunications infrastructure and service capacity and to
increase
its
participation
in
international
trade
in
telecommunications services."2 3
These limitations do not
frustrate the competitive nature of the Annex, due to their limited
application. Thus, the Annex can be seen as a pro-competitive
instrument within telecommunications regulation. 2 4
B. The GATS Fourth Protocolon Basic Communications
In an effort to foster international telecommunications, the
WTO negotiated the Fourth Protocol to GATS in 1996.25

17.
GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, supranote 8, 5(a), at 1194.
18.
See id. I 5(b)(i).
19.
See id. 5(b)(ii).
20.
See id 5(b)(ii).
21
See i
5(d)-(g), at 1194-95.
22.
"Such conditions shall be specified in the Member's schedule." I&L
5(g), at 1195.
23.
Id.
24.
See Low & MATrOO, supranote 9, at 7.
25.
See Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Attachment of the
Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 36 I.L.M. 354,
373-74 (1997) [hereinafter Fourth Protocol].
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Currently fifty-five governments, including many Eastern
European countries, are signatories to the negotiation. 2 6 In order
to participate in the Fourth Protocol, a WTO Member must adhere
to the guidelines set forth in the agreement, which sometimes
approach to the delivery
significantly alters the Member's existing
27
of basic telecommunications services.
GATS requires each Member country to file an individual
schedule 28 of commitments indicating the particular services it
seeks to conform to the GATS guidelines. 2 9 The GATS general
service principles require most-favored nation (MFN) treatment 30
of service suppliers from WTO Members, except where countries
Key GATS
take specific exemptions in their schedules. 3 1
participants were concerned that their markets would be harmed
by the MFN status accorded to some foreign competitors who
were WTO Members. 3 2 MFN treatment would require all WTO
Members with open markets to grant all other WTO Members
access to their markets on a non-discriminatory basis.3 3 This
would allow those WTO Members with closed markets4 access to
other Member's open markets without having to give up their
closed systems. Likewise, a Member who commits to open its

See id. The signatories to the Fourth Protocol are Antigua and
26.
Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Cote d'lvoire, the Czech
Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, European
Communities and their Member States, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela. See id.
27.
See generally id. at 373.
See Harwood, supra note 2, at 879. "Each country's schedule is
28.
annexed to the GATS and is incorporated into the agreement." Id.
See id.
29.
30.
"MFN treatment means regulatory treatment that is at least as
favorable as that accorded to firms from any other foreign country." Id. at 877
n.12.
See GATS, supranote 8, Art. II, at 1169; see also Harwood, supra note
31.
2, at 879; Stefan M. Meisner, Note, Global Telecommunications Competition A
Reality: United States Complies uith WTO Pact, 13 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1345, 1351
(1998).
32.
See Meisner, supra note 31, at 1351; see also Laura B. Sherman,
Introductory Note to the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, 36 I.L.M. 354, 355 (1997) (describing the free rider problem resulting
from the grant of MFN treatment in the basic telecommunications sector without
further agreement).
33.
See Sherman, supra note 32, at 355.
34.
A "closed market" refers to a market in which government-run or
government-subsidized companies (or company) control the entire economic
sector, without allowing international competitors entry into the market.
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market cannot close its market on a selective basis to service
suppliers from WTO Member countries.3 s This disparate result
showed the need for market-opening policies to accompany the
GATS agreement.
Recognizing this inequality, fifty-five countries under the
36
auspices of the WTO negotiated the Fourth Protocol to GATS.
The Fourth Protocol contains many key provisions, including
provisions concerning market access 37 and national treatment.38
The GATS market access provision requires WTO Members to
refrain from imposing certain types of quotas and other
restrictions, or local incorporation requirements,3 9 in service
sectors that those members list in their GATS schedules.40
Specifically, the market access provision prohibits six types of
limitations: (a) limitations on the number of suppliers, (b)
limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets, (c)
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the
total quantity of service output, (d) limitations on the total
number of natural persons that may be employed, (e) measures
which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint
venture, and (f) limitations on the participation of foreign
41
capital.
GATS Article XVII sets forth the national treatment provision
in a way that allows Members to specify limitations on national
treatment in their schedules, rather than making these
42
limitations an overarching principle of general application.
National treatment may be granted, denied, or qualified between
Members according to specifications in their schedules.4

35.
See Sherman, supranote 32, at 355.
36.
For the list of negotiating countries, see Fourth Protocol, supranote 25.
37.
See GATS, supra note 8, art. XVI, at 1179.
38.
See GATS, supra note 8, art. XVII, at, 1180. The national treatment
role requires WTO members to avoid treating foreign services suppliers differently
from national or domestic service suppliers. See Sherman, supra note 32, at 355
n.8.
"Incorporation' refers to the way in which a telecommunications
39.
provider gains access to a countries' telecommunications network. For example,
Poland's incorporation requirements mandate that a service provider procure a
See Polish Law on Telecommunications 1991,
telecommunications license.
translatedand reprintedin 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 585, 586 (1993).
40.
See Sherman, supranote 32, at 355 n.7.
41.
See GATS, supranote 8, art. XVI, at 1179.
42.
This differs from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which makes national treatment a general, overarching principle. The countries
negotiating the GATS agreement made national treatment subject to limitations in
order to provide a more gradual and conditioned approach to opening
telecommunications markets. See Low & MATrOO, supranote 9, at 5.
See id.
43.
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C. The Reference Paper
In addition to providing market access commitments, the
negotiating countries also decided on a set of pro-competitive
regulatory principles contained in a Reference Paper. 44 The
Reference Paper suggests the form of basic telecommunications
regulation. 45 The Reference Paper supplies the necessary road
map for WTO Member compliance with the Fourth Protocol.4
Also, the Reference Paper defines the types of anti-competitive
behavior that warrants regulation. 4 7
Further, the Reference
Paper describes the types of regulations a WTO Member should
adopt to quell such anti-competition. 48 The Reference Paper also
sets forth the interconnection4 9 obligations of Members, which

44.
The Reference Paper was never formally issued as a WTO document,
even though fifty-seven countries adopted its principles in their entirety. See
Reference Paper to the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Apr. 30, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 367 [hereinafter Reference Paper].
The
countries that adopted the Reference Paper are Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brunei, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cote dvoire, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ghana,
Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Venezuela. See Sherman, supra note 32, at 357 n.23
45.
See Reference Paper, supra note 44, at 367; see also Sherman, supra
note 32, at 357; Meisner, supra note 31, at 1354; discussion infra Part II.C.
(analyzing the Reference Paper).
46.
See generally Reference Paper, supra note 44, at 367.
47.
Examples of anti-competitive behavior include: exploiting the "essential
facilities" of a 'major supplier'; "engaging in anti-competitive cross subsidization;
using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results; and
not making available to other service suppliers on a timely basis technical
information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which
are necessary for them to provide services." Reference Paper, supra note 44, at
367. The Reference Paper further explains that the exploitation of an essential
facility can occur when "a single entity or a group of entities supplies the essential
facility and there is no economically-feasible substitute for the essential facility."
Meisner, supra note 31, at 1354 n.43; see also Reference Paper, supra note 44, at
367 (defining "major supplier" as a "supplier which has the ability to materially
affect the terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant
market for basic telecommunications services as a result of: (a) control over
essential facilities; or (b) use of its position in the market").
48.
See Reference Paper, supra note 44, at 367.
49.
See id. (describing 'interconnection" as the linking of suppliers
providing telecommunications services in order to allow "the users of one supplier
to communicate with users of another supplier and to access services provided by
another supplier); see also CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 26 (1996) (describing
interconnection as the process by which a telecommunications provider attaches
its equipment to an existing wireline network).
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allow service suppliers to connect to a major supplier in order to
50
increase competition.
In addition to describing the type of regulation WTO
countries should adopt, the Reference Paper suggests the
creation of an independent regulatory agency in each Member
country to ensure that these pro-competition objectives are
followed.5 1 With an impartial regulatory agency to deter anticompetitive behavior, the practical principles embodied in the
52
Fourth Protocol can more fully come to fruition.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
With the recent adoption of the GATS agreement in Poland, it is
important to discuss the history of Polish telecommunications
regulation in order to later analyze the increased benefits resulting
from signing the GATS agreement. As a former communist country,
Poland's telecommunications sector was extremely underdeveloped
in the 1980s.53 Polish lawmakers recognized the need to improve
telecommunications
infrastructure
in
order
to
increase
competitiveness of Polish business in other economic sectors and to
increase Poland's gross national product (GNP).5 4
The
improvements in telecommunications would enhance Poland's
international standing, which is what the Polish government hoped
to achieve by becoming a Member of the GATS agreement. 5 5
The Polish public telecommunications system suffers from
forty years of neglect after the devastation of World War 11.56
Post-war Polish governments did not find communications
infrastructure a priority.5 7 This neglect and the existing financial
limitations left Poland with little choice but to undergo vast

50.
See generally Reference Paper, supra note 44, at 368.
51.
See id. at 369 (requiring the proposed regulatory body to be "separate
from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services').
See also Harwood, supra note 2, at 884 (suggesting that this regulatory body
should prevent anti-competitive behavior because such conduct would undermine
the effects of the Fourth Protocol).
52.
See Reference Paper, supra note 44, § 5, at 369; see also Sherman,
supranote 32, at 357.
53.
See Jerzy Kubasik, Poland: Problems of Opening and Regulating the
Public Network, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAKE-OFF IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES, supra
note 1, at 97-8.

54.
For example, Polish widget producers cannot hope to compete on an
international scale if the telecommunications system in Poland is so poor that
they cannot communicate with their customers.
55.
See Karl-Ernst Schenk, Introductionto TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAKE-OFF IN
TRANSITION COUNTRIES, supra note 1, at 1.
56.
See ELI NoAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 277 (1992).

57.

See id.
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reforms in order to secure a place in today's world market.5 8
Recently, Poland has demonopolized its telecommunications
industry and allowed foreign suppliers to compete directly with
domestic service suppliers.5 9 The result has left Poland in a
transition stage, unable to support telecommunications without
substantial foreign investment and supplies and struggling to
create a sphere in which its own domestic suppliers can
60
compete.
A. Background on the Polish Telecommunications Sector
Although Poland is one of the largest Eastern and Central
European countries in terms of population and geography, 6 1 it
has one of the lowest telecommunications penetration rates 6 2 only thirteen telephone mainlines per 100 citizens-in the
region. 63 The telephone subscriber waiting list remains at over
two million, and the quality of service is low. 6 4
Poland's
telephone services have been run, primarily, by Telekomunikacja
Polska S.A. or Polish Telecommunications Joint Stock Company
(TPSA), which has historically been a state-led monopoly. 65 Of
TPSA's 72,000 employees, 18,000 are needed to operate the
manual connections 6 6 commonly found in the countryside,
making service both expensive and inefficient. 67 In the wake of
these problems, Polish lawmakers have begun to privatize and
liberalize its telecommunications sector.
The economic boom necessary to rebound Polish
telecommunications after the COCOM embargo 68 requires that

58.

See id.

59.
60.
61.

See id.
See &l. at 277-78.
Only Russia and Ukraine are larger in terms of population and

geography than Poland in Eastern and Central Europe. See Kubasik, supra note
53, at 97.
62.
"Penetration rates" refers to the extent basic telecommunications
services are available in different areas of a country. See id.
63.
See id.
64.
See k!.
65.
TPSA has historically been one of Poland's largest telecommunications
suppliers. See Noam, supra note 56, at 277. Recently, however, initial stages of
privatizing TPSA have begun. See IPO of Polish Monopoly TPSA to GenerateSome
US $936 Million, 8 E. Eur. Rep. (BNA) 738 (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter IPO of Polish
Monopoly].
66.
"Manual connections" refers to the telephone systems in which an
operator must manually connect one customer's line to another customer's line to
accomplish a connection. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw
AND POLICY 343 (2nd ed. 1998).
67.
See Kubasik, supra note 53, at 97.
68.
COCOM stands for Coordination Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls. See TELECOMMUNICATION TAKE-OFF IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES, supra note 1,
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the telecommunications infrastructure adapt to the current
demands of the economy and to the potential of its
development.6 9
The Polish government has addressed this
problem by attempting to attract foreign investment, stimulate
70
technological innovation, and encourage local entrepreneurs.
In 1990, the Polish Economic Committee implemented a plan to
restructure Polish telecommunications "from the top."7 1 The first
step in this plan was to establish a highly modem system of
international and long distance connections. 7 2
These long
distance connections bring quick and substantial profit, which
can later be used to subsidize more rural areas. 73 In such rural
areas many people have been waiting a dozen years or more for
74
residential phone lines.
The effect of this 1990 plan has been a period of slow
improvement in Poland. In 1991, an international exchange of
telecommunications equipment was inaugurated. 75
The
exchange is supported by a digital radio link with the Satellite
Telecommunication Center in Psary, which also contains digital
equipment, dramatically increasing the output of the two Intelsat
satellite stations. 76 Also in 1991, Polish and Danish companies
launched the construction of a North-South fiber-optic trunk line,
which runs from the island of Bornholm through Koszalin and
Warsaw to the southern border of Poland. 77 This fiber-optic
trunk line will provide long distance connections to these regions.
The World Bank has also financed an East-West fiber-optic trunk
line to connect Poland with the rest of Western Europe. 78 The
most salient effect of these completed projects is that now some
citizens of Poland can easily secure a connection to the telephone
system in regions where this was formerly impossible. 7 9
Unfortunately, Warsaw, many other large cities, and rural areas

at xiii. The COCOM embargo lasted from 1949-1994. See generally Trevor
Hiestand, Swords into Plowshares:Considerationsfor 21st Century Export Controls
in the United States, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 679 (1995). East European countries
traditionally supplied the Soviet Union with telecommunications equipment. The
COCOM placed restrictions that kept modem technology from Eastern countries
in order to limit supply to the Soviet Union. See Noam, supranote 56, at 275.
69.
See Kubasik, supranote 53, at 97.
70.
See id.
71.
Id. at 98.
72.
See id.
73.
See id.
74.
See id.
75.
See id.
76.
See id.
77.
See id.
78.
See id.
79.
See id. at 99.
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have not yet seen the full effects of these improvements;
therefore, further reform is still necessary.8 0
B. Poland's Telecommunications Administrative Regime
Since 1987, telecommunications in Poland has been in a
state of transition. Regulatory and administrative reform has
taken the form of a slow process of unbundling the
telecommunications sector.8 1
Originally the Polish Post,
Telegraph and Telephone (PPTr) was part of the Ministry of Post
and Telecommunications (P&T).8 2
The Ministry of P&T
determines the general policy for the development of
telecommunications in Poland and is responsible for the
supervision and coordination of all domestic telecommunications
activities.8 3 The Ministry of P&T also represents the PPT's
interests abroad in the context of both bilateral and multilateral
agreements with foreign telecommunications administrations.8 4
The legal basis for the activity of the Ministry of P&T comes
from the Act of December 1, 1989 on the establishment of the
Office of the Minister of P&T and the Act of November 23, 1990,
on Posts and Telecommunications [the Communications Act],
along with its modifications in 1991, 1992, and 1995.85 These
Acts brought an end to the state-run monopoly in the field of
telecommunications. 8 6 The Communications Act, in compliance
with GATS, sets out four levels of competitive activity in public
telecommunications: (1) international telecommunications links
and connections, (2) long distance telecommunications links and
connections, 8 7 (3) sound and television broadcasting transmitting
equipment,8 8 and (4)local telecommunications.

80.
See id.
81.
See id. at 121.
82.
See id. Between 1987 and 1989, the Ministry of Transport, Maritime
Economy and Communications managed telecommunications activities. See id.
After the new government was elected in 1989, the Ministry of P&T was reestablished and became the administrative and regulatory body responsible for
supervising and coordinating PPIT's activities. See fd.
83.
See id. But see Independent Regulatory Agency Envisioned Under New
Draft Law, 8 E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 366 (May 18, 1998) (predicting that the Ministry
may give up supervisory control to a new independent regulatory agency in
Poland's new draft of its telecommunications law).
84.
See generally Polish Law on Telecommunications 1991, supra note 39,
at 588-97.
85.
See Kubasik, supranote 53, at 121.
86.
See id. at 122.
87.
In long distance telecommunications, participation of foreign capital is
limited to 49%. See id.
88.
In sound and television broadcasting, the participation of foreign
capital is limited to 33%. See id.
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Local telecommunications services are by far the most
competitive area. A license from the Ministry of P&T is the only
eligibility requirement in order to provide telecommunications
services at the national level. 89
Up to the end of 1997, the
Ministry of P&T granted over 100 licenses, mostly to Telbank,
Kolpak, Lublin-Telekom, and Polska Telefonia Komorkowa Sp.
(Polish Cellular Telephony Ltd.-Central). 90
However, much of the telecommunications infrastructure in
Poland is still monopolistic 9 ' in the local telecommunications
sector because TPSA still provides services to the public while
playing a decisive part in the provision of almost all types of
telecommunications services.
Overseeing the activities of
licensed networks is one of TPSA's responsibilities to the Ministry
of P&T. 9 2 This dual role of the TPSA, as both a service provider
and an overseeing agency for service providers, undermines the
assertion
that
there
is
free
competition
in
Polish
93
telecommunications.
In the field of international telecommunications links and
connections, the Polish Ministry prohibits participation of foreign
capital owners. 94 These services remain under a Polish monopoly
that is run by the state. 95
Currently, only Polish domestic
systems have undergone the initial stages of privatization. 9 6
C. Recent Developments
Even with the important steps undertaken to improve this
situation in the years 1989-1994, telecommunications in Poland
is still far from satisfactory. In order to achieve its basic mission
of providing all citizens of Poland with the ability to communicate
with each other through improved telecommunications services,
the Polish government is devising laws that will establish
favorable conditions for accelerating the development of modern

89.
See id. Of course, there are strict requirements that must be met in
order to secure a license.
90.
See id. at 122-23.
91.
"Monopolistic" in this sense refers to the "control or advantage obtained
by one supplier over the commercial market within a given region." BLACK'S LAW
DIcIoNARY, supra note 7, at 1023. In Poland, ,TPSA has been given many controls
over the telecommunications sector both regulatory control and control of market
shares.
92.
See Kubasik, supra note 53, at 123.
93.
See Privatization, LiberalizationOf Markets Examined at ABA Meeting, 8
E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 388, 389 (May 18, 1998) [hereinafter ABA Meeting].
94.
See id. at 388.
95.
See Kubasik, supranote 53, at 123.
96.
See ABA Meeting, supranote 93, at 388.
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telecommunications services. 97 According to the orders of the
Ministry of P&T, all new telephone exchanges are to be based on
digital technology. 98 Modernization and expansion of phone lines
into unserviced areas will be an extremely costly endeavor. To
finance these reforms, the Polish government envisions the
following conditions before development: acquiring foreign credit,
raising the Polish banks' standards of efficiency, offering tax
discounts for operators, subsidizing installation of telephones in
outlying rural villages, implementing telecommunications tariffs
on the provision of services, and starting the process of gradual
privatization of the national operator, TPSA. 9 9
The last item on this list most concerns lawmakers familiar
with drafting regulations for change in telecommunications
infrastructure. 100 Transfer of telecommunications from public to
private control involves sizable layoffs of personnel.1 0 1 With
18,000 employees operating the manual exchanges in the
countryside, a sizable amount of this workforce would become
obsolete with the government's directive to privatize TPSA and
establish a digital telecommunications network. 1 2
The experiences of other transition countries provide
examples of the effects of transferring from public to private
control. The transfer of telecommunications to the private sector
in Brazil improved the availability of capital for investments;
moreover, rates for local users increased dramatically.1 0 3
A
similar situation may arise in Poland; rates may increase beyond
the means of Poland's citizenry. With many Polish citizens
unable to afford these services and possibly out of work as a
result of privatization, the government's proposed reforms may be
closer to utopian ideals than practical solutions to Poland's
problems.
Nevertheless, Polish lawmakers believe that by
increasing Polish telecommunications technology today, later the
possible increase in GNP created by economic competitiveness
can subsidize provision of services to Polish citizens. 1 4

97.
98.

See Kubasik, supra note 53, at 99.
See id. (citing MINISTRY OF POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, DEVELOPMENT

PLANS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL SERVICES, DOCUMENT FOR PARLIAMENT
COMMISSION OF COMMERCE AND SERVICES (1992)).

99.

See Kubasik, supra note 53, at 114-15.

100.

See PETRAZZINI, supra note 3, at 165.

101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 170.
See Kubasik, supranote 53, at 97.
See PETRAZZINI, supra note 3, at 181.
See discussion supra Part III.
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Polish officials expect to generate four billion U.S. dollars
(PLN fifteen billion) in privatization revenues in 1999.105 The
government plans to reinvest most of the revenues in the
telecommunications sector.106
The revenues will be used to
facilitate Poland's main goal of privatizing the domestic
telecommunications market by 2003.107 The Polish Cabinet
approved its Strategic Outline of Telecommunications Market
Development, 1998-2001 in August of 1998.108
The outline
establishes that 1999 will be a year of increased privatization of
domestic telecommunications firms and increased competition
between service providers. 10 9 For example, in mid-October 1998,
Poland's Treasury Ministry launched the initial public offering of
TPSA on international stock exchanges. 1 10 By the end of 1999, it
is estimated that TPSA will have a private operator competing
against it in every region in Poland. 11 1 As new developments
continue, TPSA may begin to lose its dominant position, as
Poland's telecommunications market prepares to open up in
order to meet GATS commitments by 2003.112
D. Poland'sAdherence to GATS Principles
As a
Member
of the
GATS
agreement,
Poland's
telecommunications law attempts to follow the GATS' privatization
objective. By becoming a signatory to the GATS policies covering
telecommunications trade in services, Poland sends a message to
industrialized nations that investment in Polish telecommunications
will be fruitful. Poland's administrators believe that first attracting
foreign investment and technology will achieve Poland's current
mission of allowing its citizens and all bodies of administration to
communicate with each other with required quality.1 1 3 With this
primary mission in mind, Poland became a Member to the GATS
agreements.

*105. See Government Expects PLN 15 Billion in PrivatizationRevenues Next
Year, 8 E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 616 (Sept. 1998) (citing a forecast made by Treasury
Minister Emil Wasacz).
106. See id. at 617.
107. See Cabinet Adopts 'Strategic Outline' As a Guide For Proposed
Legislation, 8 E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 617 (Sept. 1998) [hereinafter CabinetAdopts].
108.
See id.
109.
See id.
110.
See IPO of Polish Monopoly, supra note 65, at 738. The initial public
offering included 15% of TPSA, 5% sold on the domestic market and 15% sold on
international markets. See id. The Treasury set TPSA's initial share price at
US$4.44 (PLN 15.20), valuing the company at US $936 million (PLN 3.2 billion).
See id.
111. See id. at 739.
112. See id.
113. See Kubasik, supranote 53, at 99.
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1. Poland's Participation
Poland is a signatory to the GATS agreement, 1 14 the Fourth
16
In its schedule, 11 7
Protocol, 115 and the Reference Paper. 1
Poland committed to liberalize international public voice facilities
and telegraph by 2003.118 Long distance public voice services
and facilities and cellular mobile telephone services will also be
liberalized by 2003.119 The domestic telecommunications market
will be liberalized sooner, by 2000.120
Poland also placed some limitations on foreign investment in
its schedule in order to provide for a more gradual adjustment to
freer trade in services. 12 1 The schedule limits foreign equity in
Polish telecommunications services to forty-nine percent for all
international and domestic long distance services and public
cellular services.' 2 2
This limitation is consistent with the
national treatment requirement in the Fourth Protocol, as a
country's
schedule
of commitment
can
specify
these
restrictions.' 23 Easing into free trade will also help Poland to
12 4
cope with the problematic effects of privatization.
2. Poland's Domestic Communications Law
Poland's objective to adhere to GATS principles shaped the
formation of its communications laws. Poland's Communications
Act specifies those entities entitled to provide telecommunications
services as: (1) Poland's chief joint stock company TPSA, (2)
"[o]rganizational units under the jurisdiction of the ministers of
national defense and internal affairs," and (3) "[e]ntities which
[have] received a telecommunications license." 125
The
Communications Act sets up a licensing system whereby the
Minister of Communications' 2 6 grants a license 12 7 to providers 128

114.
See GATS, supranote 8, at 1168.
115.
See Fourth Protocol, supranote 25, at 374.
116.
See Sherman, supra note 32, at 357 n.23.
117.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
118.
See World Trade Organization, Highlights of Commitments and M.f.n.
Exemptions Resulting from Negotiations, <http://www.wto.org/wto/services/
tell3.htm> (visited Sept. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Highlights] (webpage no longer
available, on file with author).
119.
See id.
120.
See id.
121.
See id.
122.
See id.
123.
See Low & MATroo, supra note 9, at 5.
124.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
125.
See Polish Telecommunications Act, supra note 39, art 4 at 586.
126.
See id.art. 17, at 589.
127.
See id.(giving license specifications).
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of telecommunications services.
The Executive Order 12 9 on
Telecommunications Equipment does not, however, require
permits for the installation and operation of telecommunications
networks that are not connected directly or indirectly to the
public telecommunications network.1 3 0
The Minister of
Communications may not grant licenses for the provision of
international public telecommunications services. 13 1
Poland's licensing system is in compliance with the GATS
obligations and the Reference Paper.13 2 The Reference Paper
further specifies that where a license is required, the period of
time, licensing criteria, and terms and conditions of individual
licenses should be made public on a non-discriminatory basis.13 3
It also sets forth that the "reasons for denial of a license will be
made known to the applicant upon request."'" Entities granted
a license pay annual fees for the Operation of telecommunications
lines, facilities, or networks.' 3 5 As long as these fees are required
on a non-discriminatory basis, Poland's licensing system is in
conformance with GATS objectives as well as the Reference Paper.
Currently, the Minister of Communications requires licensed
operators to interconnect to the existing Polish network
system.' 3 6 The Minister of Communications may further refine
interconnection standards by issuing an executive order defining
technical and operating requirements or requirements for the
"coordinated operation of telecommunications facilities, lines and
137
networks."
The Minister of Communications supervises the State
Telecommunications
Inspectorate
(PIT),
which monitors
telecommunications lines, networks, and facilities. 138
The

128.
Polish Telecommunications Act, Article 15 states, "Licenses may be
granted to entities which, under separate regulations, are authorized to operate
on the territory of the Republic of Poland." Id. art. 15.
129.
Made pursuant to Article 13 of the Polish Telecommunications Act

setting forth that "the minister of communications issues an executive order
listing the telecommunications facilities, lines, and networks whose installation
and operation do not require a license." Id. art. 13.
130.
See Polish Executive Order on Telecommunications Equipment, Apr. 23,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Central & Eastern European Legal Texts
File.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Polish Telecommunications Act, supranote 39, art. 16.
See Reference Paper, supranote 44, at 369.
See id. at 368-69.
Id. at 369.
See Polish Telecommunications Act, supra note 39, art. 20.1 at 590.
See Henrik Pr6Zdorf, Options and Reforms in a Political Economic

Perspective, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAKE-oFF IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES, supra note

1, at 225.
137.
Polish Telecommunications Act, supranote 39, art. 9, at 588.
138.
See id. art. 30.1-30.3, at 594.
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Minister employs the PIT monitoring agency, an executive agency,
to inspect all entities providing telecommunications services and
to provide a report detailing compliance with Polish regulations
and licensing requirements. 1 3 9 If these provisions are not met,
to Article Nineteen
the Minister may revoke the license pursuant
14
of the Polish Law on Communications. 0
3. Polish Government Program for Privatization of the Polish
Economy
The plan to privatize the telecommunications industry is
consistent with the Polish government's overall objective of
privatization. The Polish government's plan operates under the
premise that "privatization is a precondition for the development
of an efficient market economy." 14 1 The Polish government has
also said that commercialization' 4 2 is the first step in the
or
In the next stage, "[s]hares 144
privatization process. 14
participations may be made available to potential investors,
including individuals, groups of individuals, or domestic or
foreign enterprises." 145 TNCs have a lot of capital and can outbid
a
creating
shares,
these
for
corporations
domestic
This
interests.
outside
by
telecommunications sector largely run
leads to the possibility that the once monopoly-based Polish
telecommunications sector may change hands to become a
foreign-owned oligopoly, managed by mostly U.S.-based TNCs.
Eastern European authorities are acutely aware of the fear
that competitors from more technically-advanced countries will
overrun its private industries. 1 46 The authorities have heard
these concerns from traditional government-granted monopoly
firms wishing to keep TNCs out of the Polish telecommunications
sector. 14 7 In recent years, however, Polish authorities have been
more willing to enhance privatization of its telecommunications

See id. art. 29.3-29.7, at 593.
139.
See id. art. 19, at 590.
140.
Polish Government Program for Privatization of Polish Economy, Dec.
141.
1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, Central & Eastern European Legal Texts
File.
142. Commercialization is the transformation of a state enterprise into a
joint stock company with the Treasury as the only shareholder. See id.
See id.
143.
144. This is usually done in the form of initial public offerings or IPOs. The
most recent example is the IPO of TPSA. See 1PO of Polish Monopoly, supra note
65, at 738.
145. Polish Government Program for Privatization of Polish Economy, supra
note 142.
See Kruse, supranote 1, at 8.
146.
See id. at 7.
147.
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sector1 48 in order to increase its know-how in communications
and information technologies and to improve its penetration
rates. 149

In order to achieve privatization, Poland needs Western
technologies and large investments. To obtain these, Poland has
to provide business opportunities to attract private firms. 15 0 If
Poland were to move too far in the direction of liberalizing its
markets, however, the fears of foreign ownership of
telecommunications could become realities.
IV. COMPARISON OF POLAND'S COMMUNICATIONS LAW TO OTHER
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGIMES

The telecommunications sectors in other Central and Eastern
European countries have some common traits with Poland,15 1
and their reforms in communications laws have taken similar
routes.1 5 2
However, there are differences in regulatory
arrangements between these countries.1 5 3 Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic all vest regulatory authority in a minister,
who then directs other regulation authorities 5 4 that are
55
responsible for the more technical management tasks.1
Liberalization has proceeded along each country's individual
schedule annexed to the Fourth Protocol.' 5 6 Poland and Hungary
now allow private operators in local and regional networks;
however, privatization has moved more slowly in the Czech
Republic.' 5 7 One striking example of the differences between the
Eastern
European countries' regulations concerns the

148. For example, the Polish government has agreed to designate the city of
Krakow as a free economic zone in order to increase foreign investment to the
area. See Motorola To Invest Up To $108 Million In Facilities At Krakow High-Tech
Park, 8 E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 298 (Apr. 20, 1998). The U.S.-based Motorola
Company has taken advantage of the free economic zone and recently agreed to
invest up to $108 million in Krakow to build a new software center. See id.; see
also Links to Poland'sHigh-Tech Sector, 8 E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 298 (Apr. 20, 1998).
149. See Kruse, supranote 1, at 7.
150. See id. at 7-8.
151. See Prdigdorf, supranote 136, at 223.
152. For a comparison of developing privatization in Brazil, see generally
Hobday, supranote 1, at 88-202.
153.
See Pr~gdorf, supra note 136, at 223.
154. See id. (stating that differences between these authorities are more on
the level of organization structure).
155. See id.; see also Czechoslovakia Law on Administrative Jurisdiction,
Sept. 19, 1990, § 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, Central & Eastern
European Legal Texts.
156. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 25, at 373.
157. See Pr~itdorf, supranote 136, at 224-25.

POLISH COMMUNICATIONS LAW

2000]

167

privatization of long distance telephone networks. While Poland
allows competition, restricting only foreign ownership to fortynine percent,' 5 8 Hungary and the Czech Republic still permit
I5 9
monopolies on long-distance service.
Poland, Hungary, 160 and the Czech Republic have all
implemented licensing systems. 16 1 Further, all three impose
obligations on licensed operators in order to maintain some
control of foreign operations in their respective countries while
complying with the GATS non-discrimination policy. 16 2 Poland
requires licensed operators to interconnect to its network and
163
provide an individual development timetable for each operator.
Similarly, the Czech Republic requires each licensed operator to
submit a development plan16 4 in order to foster development of
domestic telephone networks. 165
Hungary requires licensed
operators to meet certain growth requirements.16 6 By providing
licensing systems, Eastern European countries liberalize private
networks and comply with GATS market access provisions.
However, the licensing agreements enable the domestic
telecommunications administrators to retain some control of
foreign participation.
The Central Eastern European countries have implemented
these various telecommunications sector reforms, 16 7 moving
toward more competition and less government control. 168 The
pressure to implement even more reforms is more intense than in
69
Western countries with existing adequate technologies.1
Starting from a position of inadequate infrastructure after the

158.
See id. at 225 tbl. 9.2.
159.
See id.
160.
See Hungarian Law on Telecommunications (Act LXXII), Sept. 1, 1993,
§19, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts.
161.
See Pr65dorf, supranote 136, at 224-25 tbls. 9.1, 9.2.
162.
See id. at 225 tbl. 9.2.
163.
See id.
164. There are two republic-level operators in the Czech Republic that make
up the Czech Telcom companies: SPT Praha and SPT Bratislava. See Noam, supra
note 56, at 279.
165.
See Pr~f~dorf, supranote 136, at 225 tbl. 9.2.
166.
See id.
167.
For a comparison with telecommunications reforms in Sub-Saharan
Africa, see generally S. T. Kwame Boafo, CommunicationTechnology and Dependent
Development in Sub-SaharanAfrica, in TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS: WIRING THE
THIRD WORLD 103, 103-24 (Gerald Sussman & John A. Lent eds., 1991). For a
comparison with Latin American reforms, see generally WALTER T. MOLANO, THE
LOGIC OF PRIVATIZATION: THE CASE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE OF

LATIN AMERICA (1997).

For a comparison with communications in India, see

generally STEPHEN D. McDOWELL, GLOBALIZATION, LIBERALIZATION AND
CHANGE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDIA'S COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR (1997).

168.
169.

See Pr61gdorf, supranote 136, at 195.
See id.
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communist era, Eastern European countries are trying to move
toward international competitiveness as quickly as possible. To
compound matters, nearly every sector of these countries'
economies is currently undergoing privatization efforts, making
state budgets tight. 170 This common situation leaves the Eastern
European countries relying on foreign financing in the form of
17 1
TNC investment and supply of services.

V. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE PRIVATIZATION

PROCESS
The WTO specified in the GATS agreement that "[members
shall make available, where practicable, to developing countries
information with respect to telecommunications services and
developments in telecommunications and information technology
to assist in strengthening their domestic telecommunications
services sector." 172 In most countries, however, this information
is in the hands of private telecommunications companies.
Making such information available to other countries' developing
telecommunications sectors usually comes with the price of
increased control of the provision of such services to that
73

country.1

U.S. TNCs are among the world's heaviest consumers of
international telecommunications services, and U.S.-based
companies are highly competitive relative to their international
rivals. 174 Due to its competitive position, the United States has
competition among
long sought to promote increased
The U.S.
international telecommunications providers. 175
government, encouraged by the lobbying efforts of multinational
companies,
employs
an international
telecommunications

170. See id.
171. These Eastern European countries have relied on foreign investment
more recently. For example, the Ericsson company signed a large contract to
provide Poland, Serbia, and the Ukraine with equipment worth more than $100
million. See Ericsson Wins Big Orders in Ukraine, Poland, Serbia, 8 E. EUR. REP.
(BNA) 297 (Apr. 20, 1998). The Czech Republic's two rival telecommunications
companies have realized the need for foreign investment and have listed their
stock on the London Stock Exchange in an effort to secure expansion capital. See
Competing Czech Companies List GDRs on London Exchange, 8 E. EUR. REP. (BNA)
461 (BNA) (June 15, 1998).
172. GATS, supranote 8, 6(c), at 1195.
173. See MOLANO, supranote 167, at 123. (stating that investors are offering
to provide new technology to developing countries in return for "buying up* staterun services).
174. See Harwood, supranote 2, at 874.
175. See id.
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strategy
to
induce
other
countries
to
open
their
telecommunications markets.1 76
The first branch of this strategy is for the United States to
participate in multilateral market access agreements, including
the WTO's GATS agreement, Telecommunications Annex, and the
Reference Paper. 177 The Telecommunications Annex to GATS
"guarantees that providers of any service for which a country has
made a market access commitment under the GATS will have
access to that country's public telecommunications networks and
services on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis."178 This
policy decreases some of the barriers to entry that have stymied
17 9
TNC access to foreign telecommunications sectors in the past.
The second branch of this strategy is to use the power of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over licensing and
ownership regulations of U.S.-based telecommunications companies
as leverage to prompt individual countries to open up their foreign
markets to these companies.1 8 0
These competitive safeguards
enacted by the FCC were implemented in order to stimulate lower
prices and more responsive services.' 8 ' However, until recently
many countries prohibited or restricted U.S.-based TNCs' provision
of basic telecommunications services as an encroachment on their
18 2
national operators' monopolies.
Transition countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, have
come to realize that they need Western technologies and
investments
in
order to
expand
and improve
their
telecommunications sectors. 183 In order to attract TNCs to their
domestic spheres, these countries have to provide business
opportunities for private firms.' 8 4 This calls for liberalization of
their basic telecommunication markets.' 8 5 Transition countries
also must maintain competitive structures, such as an accessible
licensing system, and keep entry barriers low in order to prevent
8 6
market dominance.1
This liberalization process, however, may be accompanied by
certain pitfalls.
Many Eastern European governments have
maintained strict certification procedures in order to keep control
of basic telecommunications provision in the hands of domestic

176.

See id. at 875-76.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. at 877, 879-80.
See id. at 880.
See Ud.at 876.
See id.
See id. at 875-76.
See id. at 876.
See Kruse, supranote 1, at 8.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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firms. 1 8 7 Unfortunately, this has the effect of maintaining the
controlling domestic suppliers' monopolies.18 8 Thus, small-scale
domestic service providers cannot exist on their own in these
Eastern European countries without some foreign backing.
Foreign TNCs, therefore, must have a certain share of the
economy in order to create the competition necessary for
privatization.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE EFFICIENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGIMES IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES

Participation in worldwide, pro-competitive agreements
delivers the possibility of increased access to telecommunications
services in transition countries. Some externalities accompany
increased access, and analysis of policy decisions should take
these externalities into account. The extent to which the GATS
objectives increase competition is also the subject of debate. It is
not likely that a global telecommunications sector will emerge
from present levels of competition and cross-border trade, but the
possibility still concerns international lawmakers. This section
analyzes domestic control of telecommunications and offers
recommendations to transition countries for the development of
laws that will provide a more efficient use and provision of
telecommunications services.
A. ExternalitiesAssociated with Telecommunications Reform
Transition countries' approaches to telecommunications
reform differ regionally based on certain "network externality
Issues such as equity, public participation,
variables." 18 9
economic and power distribution, welfare benefits, social
accountability, and the protection of national, cultural, political,
and personal sovereignty come into play when discussing the
effects of increased access to public telecommunications. 190 The
GATS negotiations placed considerable emphasis on the role of
foreign investment. 19 1 The internal reaction to direct foreign

187.
See Pr85dorf, supranote 136, at 225 tbl. 9.2.
188. See icl.
189. See R. Capello & P. Nijkamp, Access to Telecommunication Networks:
Regional Variations in Consumption Network Externalities, in OVERCOMING ISOLATION
129, 143 (Henry Coccossis & Peter Nijkamp, eds., 1995).
190. See Low & MATrOO, supranote 9, at 1
191. See id. at 15.
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investment and the provision of foreign technology has a striking
19 2
effect on network externality variables.
The type of development taking place in transition countries,
at least at first, leads to some of these externalities, including
inequity, misallocation of resources, and increasing polarization
of wealth and poverty. 193 Exacerbating this decrease in social
welfare is the problem that most of those who work to build the
physical configurations needed for telecommunications networks
9 4
to grow usually are the last to receive access to the system.'
Politicians and state agents often dismiss these equity problems
by stating that the "comparative advantage" 19 s of increased
access to telecommunications justifies the initial stages of
distorted development. 196
Many lawmakers believe that
improving the telecommunications infrastructure will generally
benefit Poland, as increasing the ability of Polish businesses to
communicate with more customers increases GNP. 19 7 However,
if social inequities are not alleviated-as part of a national agenda
to increase equality of provision as well as quality of provisionthe social welfare of national citizens will remain a problem.
Also, increased provision of advanced technology (such as email and internet service provided through phone lines) increases
communication and the spread of ideas between transition
countries and capitalist First World cultures. 198 Some international
policy analysts have argued that the influx of foreign culture
available through telecommunications
has decreased
the
homogeneity of domestic culture. 19 9 International organizations °0
have used telecommunications media to spread progressive
information resources and have attempted to enfranchise groups

192.
See id. at 15-16.
193.
See Gerald Sussman & John A. Lent, Introduction: Critical Perspectives
on Communication and Third World Development4
in
TRANSNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 167, at 19.

194.

See id.

195.

See GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 79

(5th ed. 1992) (defining 'comparative advantage" as the idea that agents are most
efficiently employed in activities they perform relatively better than others. In
international trade it is suggested that countries specialize in areas in which they
have a comparative advantage.).
196.
See Sussman & Lent, supra note 193, at 19-20.
197.
See supratext accompanying notes 57 and 105.
198.
See Sussman & Lent, supra note 193, at 20.
199.
See id. (arguing that exposure to foreign culture has increased
'personal independence-oriented, society-focused, and nationally conscious
norms" which overcome the semifeudal values which may remain in former-

Communist countries).
200.
For example, Peacenet and other humanist, social groups use
telecommunications to spread their messages to those in transition countries.
See id. at 22.
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across national boundaries. 20 1 Ambitious for increased foreign
capital to spend on development, state authorities have paid less
attention to the possibility of waning cultural identity.20 2 However,
as TNCs begin to supply services, national telecommunications
providers may become less well known domestically. Riddled with
foreign propaganda and commercials, the telecommunications
20 3
sector in transition countries may lose its "national" appeal.
of
privatization
and
liberalization
Although
telecommunications sectors are touted as beneficial to transition
countries, many world lawmakers, including the WTO, do not
factor these externalities into the analysis. When a transition
country drafts its telecommunications laws, it should address
such externalities. Ultimately, the costs and benefits of certain
provisions may be0 4valued differently after weighing externalities
2
into the analysis.
B. Global Competition-The UniversalMarket?

International legal scholars have contemplated the possibility
Some scholars
of a universal, telecommunications market. 20 5
urge developing countries to draft domestic laws in order to
achieve this result. 20 6 A WTO agreement on easier and nondiscriminatory market access is only one step towards the
creation of a globally competitive telecommunications regime,
however.2 0 7 Issues such as international competition, pricing
policy, and barriers to trade must be addressed before global
competition will loom on the horizon. Although the WTO stresses
the importance of global cooperation in bringing about a
universal market, such a universal system, if it is developed at
all, probably will not originate for some time. Therefore, even
though the possibility of a global market excites international
policy makers, in reality countries like Poland do not, and should
not, stress a universal market as a goal in drafting their current
telecommunications laws. Some issues relevant to privatization,
however, may reflect the legal and policy decisions needed to
increase market universality.
International competition policy is now overwhelmingly
concerned with stripping away the access barriers created by the

201.

See id.

202.
203.
204.

See id. at 21.
See id. at 37.
See Capeo & Nijkamp, supranote 189, at 143.
See VINCENT CABLE & CATHERINE DISTLER, GLOBAL SUPERHIGHWAYS: THE

205.
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 33 (1995).

206.
207.

See id. at 37.
See id. at 33.
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nationalized telecommunications monopolies: the move toward
privatization. 20 8 As soon as these countries achieve the soughtafter privatization, national regulators will have to provide
regulation of "unfair" competitive trade practices or monopolistic
behavior. 2 09
It may be that upon liberalization of the
telecommunications sector of Poland, Polish regulators may be
unprepared to pass new anti-trust regulations, similar to those in
the United States. 21 0
The Polish infrastructure is also illsuppliers and their
equipped to monitor or police TNC
21 1
subsidiaries for monopolistic behavior.
Another complicated element of establishing cross-border
competition in the provision of telecommunications services is
price control. 2 12 In many countries, cross-border pricing and
revenue sharing are based on an artificial and negotiated
"settlement price." 21 3 This price bears little relation to the actual
2 14
costs of provision or the price charged to consumers.
Although the GATS agreement admonishes price discrimination,
countries with newly demonopolized telecommunications markets
may have difficulty adjusting prices away from settlement prices
2 15
and towards a "fair pricing" policy.
In practice, subtle use of barriers to trade can deny market
2 16
access to other countries, even in theoretically open systems.
Anti-competitive policies, price discrimination, or strict licensing
standards may inhibit free trade even in Member countries
complying with the GATS agreement. Although these practices
prevent total global free trade in telecommunications services,
they may provide for more domestic control, at least for the
21 7
present.
Full global competition may be further away than some
telecommunications analysts currently perceive due to false
indicators of liberalization. In many transition countries, the
withdrawal, at least partially, of direct government participation
in telecommunications has accompanied liberalization.2 1 8 The
decrease of state ownership of telecommunications markets is not
necessarily a reliable indicator of the degree of privatization that

208.
209.

Id.
See id. at 36.

210.
The United States has set up anti-trust regulations in the Sherman
Act. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1998).
211.
See CABLE & DISTLER, supra note 205, at 36.
212.
See id. at 33.
213.
See id.
214.
See id.
215.
See id.
216.
See id. at 35.
217.
See id.
218.
See Low & MATTOO, supranote 9, at 27.
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has occurred, however. 2 19 Also, foreign direct investment does
not necessarily correspond with the degree of market
openness. 2 20
In part, the absence of a correlation results
because domestically-owned firms can offer competition for the
established incumbents and because foreign firms try to gain a
22 1
monopolistic position similar to that of a state-run market.
Thus, the result is that the degree of foreign market penetration
that has occurred is not always an adequate indicator of the
degree of competition in a telecommunications sector.
Global competition currently does not loom on the horizon.
Transition countries first need to overcome price controls,
barriers to entry, and false indicators of market openness.
Although WTO negotiations try to stress the utopia of global
competition, the GATS agreements on telecommunications are
only the commencement
of global telecommunications
competition.
C. Analysis of Domestic Control

Domestic governments in transition countries, such as
Poland, comply with the GATS agreement in order to encourage
TNCs from industrial countries
to invest in Polish
telecommunications systems. Poland's regulators also strive to
check foreign ownership and control to prevent a TNC-dominated
domestic telecommunications sector, however. These checks are
largely in the form of licensing systems and limits on investment,
and they result in curbing the ideal of "free trade." The GATS
agreement allows such checks, assuming the Member follows the
basic goals of GATS in the Basic Telecommunications Act's 5(g)
exception.2 2 2 This section allows a Member country to place
restrictions on free trade in telecommunications services for the
purpose of strengthening its domestic infrastructure and
2 23
services.
In the haste to comply with the GATS agreement and to
compete internationally in telecommunications, however,
transition countries often neglect the development of adequate
infrastructure. Transition countries must establish a framework
for internal regulation and control before attempting to expand
their connections beyond the boundaries capable of their

219.
See id.
220.
See id. (analyzing the relationship between foreign direct investment
and the degree of openness of telecommunications markets in the Asian transition

countries).
221.
222.
223.

See id.
See discussion infra Part I.
See GATS, supranote 8, at 1195.
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administrative control. The rush to "get wired" should not be at
the expense of failing to train individuals capable of maintaining
224
the administrative system.
International trade in telecommunications and information
services can be divided into three overlapping categories:
225
provision of equipment, services, and direct investment.
Although governments in transition countries seek to encourage
provision of equipment and direct foreign investment, it is
difficult to believe TNCs will provide these services without also
attempting to control provision of services. Transition countries
need to accept that all three sections of the market are bound
together and that it is very difficult to separate the three.
Therefore, telecommunications lawmakers need to weigh the
benefits of increased provision of services with the costs of
decreased domestic control and provide telecommunications laws
that adequately reflect the outcomes of decreasing domestic
provider protections. Strict licensing requirements and foreign
investment inducements will counteract each other if lawmakers
do not decide which policy to support.
D. Recommendations
Overcoming these constraints on the development of
telecommunications is perhaps the most daunting challenge
transition countries face today.
The economic, financial,
institutional, and technical issues that must be addressed in order
to effectively provide telecommunications services are critical. To be
effective, telecommunications laws first must alleviate immediate
problems while also preparing for long-term institutional and policy
decisions. International telecommunications commitments should
not be considered passing fancy, subject to later retraction. Such
domestic regulations and commitments of world efforts to control
telecommunications must last long enough to ensure material
improvements, including an orderly flow of resources into and out of
2 26
the transition country.
Poland and other transition countries made a good start by
joining the GATS Annex on Telecommunications, the Fourth
Protocol, and the Reference Paper. Committing to the WTO's procompetition regulations portrays to international financing
agencies and other sources of external financing the high priority

224.

See Low & MATroo, supranote 9, at 1.
See JANE H. YUROW, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY 180-81 (1983).
226.
See Wellenius, supra note 3, at 35.

225.
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given to telecommunications. 2 2 7 National financing and planning
authorities
also
need
to
continue
to
consider
the
telecommunications sector as a high priority industry and
explicitly consider telecommunications investment as they do
other spending on infrastructure for different economic
2 28
sectors.
However, given the scarcity of investment resources, efficient
use of such investment should become the main focus of
administrators in transition countries. Selective introduction of
new services, encouraging liberalization among trade partners,
decreasing protection of incumbent providers, and training
regulators will help increase efficiency in provision of
telecommunications services.
1. Provision of New Services
Transition countries must first alleviate inequities by
providing and improving telephone services, which will constitute
the core of telecommunications investment. 22 9
As this
infrastructure is built up, new specialized communications
services, otherwise unaffordable, can be provided at low marginal
cost. 23 0 Because transition countries are largely building their
telecommunications networks from the ground in many areas of
the country, they can skip the initial steps in telecommunications
evolution and start with more advanced services. For example,
Polish lawmakers have codified this policy by making a law
providing that all new telephone exchanges will be based on
digital technology. 23 1 This will save money in the long run, while
allowing such countries to offer businesses better technology.
Additional new services can later be added at marginal cost, once
a second stage of investment becomes available. Providing laws
requiring a core set of advanced services is a more cost-effective
solution for a country's overall communications regime than
supplying each component separately, as investment allows.
Also, provision of new services signals to foreign investment
sources that telecommunications development is a priority in that
country. Finally, these laws would allow greater flexibility to

227. Commitments to provide market access and national treatment at a
future date are binding under WTO law. See Low & MATroo, supra note 9, at 23.
Failure to honor these commitments would create an obligation to pay damages to
those who are deprived of benefits. See U This need to compensate under WTO
agreements makes the commitment to liberalize more credible. See id.
228. See Wellenius, supranote 3, at 35.
229. See discussion infra Part III.A.
230. See Wellenius, supra note 3, at 35.
231. See Kubasik, supra note 53, at 99.
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respond to changing needs and would "facilitate subsequent
2 32
development of new services."
2. Encouraging Liberalization Among Trading Partners
Countries would benefit if their trading partners were also to
liberalize their communications industry. For example, many
countries took advantage of the liberalizing momentum created in
the GATS negotiations because this made it easier to undertake
market-opening obligations in the absence of quid pro quo terms
specific to each country.2 3 3 Therefore, Poland should encourage
smaller Eastern European countries to liberalize their
telecommunications regimes and to become signatories to the
GATS agreements. 23 4 Governments can create greater domestic
support for liberalization, through building cross-sectoral
coalitions, if other governments are moving in the same direction
2 35
at the same time.
3. Decrease Protection of Domestic Incumbent Suppliers
One of the reasons governments in transition countries are
unwilling
to
liberalize
their
telecommunications
sector
immediately is a variant of the traditional "infant industry"
argument.2 3 6 National firms often prefer to operate as high costpoor quality producers in a protected market, rather than as low
cost-high quality producers facing international competition. 23 7
Although Poland signed the GATS agreement that obligated it to
decrease some protection of domestic suppliers, the extent that
Poland will decrease protection is not apparent.
Protection of domestic firms is socially costly, as it requires
government agencies to provide research and development for a
market unwilling to expand or improve quality of services. 2 38 By
cutting back on domestic firm protection, foreign investors may
provide transition countries with the positive effects of additional

232. Wellenius, supranote 3, at 36.
233.
See Low & MATTOO, supra note 9, at 26.
234.
For example, Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine are Poland's neighboring
countries that are not signatories to the Fourth Protocol. See Fourth Protocol,
supranote 25, at 373.
235.
See Low & MATroo, supra note 9, at 19.
236.
See id. at 22.
237.
This is due to the fear that international competitors will drive prices
down so low that domestic providers will not be able to continue to supply services
profitably. See id. at 22 n. 15.
238.
Even though these domestic firms charge higher rates for service,
expansion into rural areas is not economically rational given the high cost of
equipment needed to extend service. See id.
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capital: the transfer of technology and know-how. This decrease
of protection would improve Poland's telecommunications sector
as a whole.
4.

Establishing an Independent Regulatory Agency

A new telecommunications law, being drafted by the Polish
Telecommunications
Ministry,2 3 9
proposes
establishing
an
independent regulatory body to take on several key regulatory
functions currently performed by the Ministry. 24 ° This legislation
concurs with GATS policy, as the Reference Paper suggested
establishing an independent regulatory agency. 2 4 1
The new
regulatory agency would issue licenses, negotiate interconnection
fees, and regulate telecommunications tariffs. 24 2 Critics of the
agency are concerned that, if established, it will become 'yet
another bureaucracy." 24 3
The Ministry supports the agency's
creation, however, stating that the agency will be given a
"sufficient amount of power to regulate and supervise the
244
market."
With an emphasis on supervision instead of control, the
Polish administration hopes that an independent regulator will
foster free-market ideals and attract more foreign investment,
thereby increasing competition. New legislation would render the
PIT,
which
supervised
compliance
with
Polish
telecommunications laws under the control of the Ministry of
P&T, obsolete. Perhaps this would free government funds to
provide
for
a
Polish telecommunications
research
and
development
subsidy
or
to
subsidize
provision
of
telecommunications services in rural areas. 2 45 An independent
regulatory agency enables governments to concentrate on efficient
provision of services, while giving foreign service providers further
2
incentive to invest in Polish telecommunications. "6

239. This new law is still in the process of being drafted as of publication of
this Note.
240. See Independent Regulatory Agency En'isioned Under New Draft Law, 8
E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 366 (May 18, 1998) [hereinafter New Draft Law].
241.
See Reference Paper, supra note 44, at § 5, 369 (requiring the proposed
regulatory body to be "separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of
basic telecommunications services"); see also Harwood, supra note 2, at 884
(suggesting that this regulatory body should prevent anti-competitive behavior
because such conduct would undermine the effects of the Fourth Protocol).
242.
See New DraftLaw, supranote 240, at 366.
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting Ministry spokesman Miroslaw Luniewski).
245. See CABLE & DISTLER, supranote 205, at 36.
246. This incentive stems from an alleviated concern that the government
acts in the interests of its domestic firms and tends to protect those firms at the
expense of TNCs. See New Draft Law, supranote 240, at 366.
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5. Administrative Support
Few transitional governments or regulatory agencies have
any experience or institutional context for the types of regulatory
activities that accompany liberalization. 2 4 7 Some telecommunications policy analysts believe that transition governments will
have to contend with significant "teething problems" as they attempt to put their regulatory machinery in place. 248 Such diffi2 49
culties may spill over into WTO dispute resolution fora.
Independence
of
administrators
can
partly
solve
administrative inexperience. 25 0 If government officials do not
have to spend time training and overseeing activities in the
industry, they can provide innovative regulations to facilitate
privatization in compliance with the GATS agreements. Experts
in the industry can direct the new independent agency, providing
skill and training to those less familiar with new technologies.
The WTO should include an administrative telecommunications
training policy in its next international agreement. With the vast
influx of information flowing into privatizing transition countries,
administrators need to be familiar with current trends in the
industry to create laws to control the system and run it
effectively.251 Without efficiency, many service providers will not
invest. On the other hand, in a loose system with little control of
licensing for example, domestic firms will lose too much business
to TNCs, thereby decreasing the number of domestic service
providers and creating new foreign oligopolies of service
providers. 25 2
Transition countries' telecommunications laws
should strive to achieve a middle ground.
6. Public Subsidies for Research and Development
Plans to privatize in transition countries include putting
domestic companies on the stock market to increase capital.2 5 3
The government may use the increase in capital to train
incumbent suppliers to use and provide new technologies and to

247.
See Low & MATroo, supranote 9, at 25. Those who have accumulated
regulatory experience have taken a number of years to acquire it, and there are
many disputes as to the best approach. See id
248.
See id. (mentioning the problems associated with the "teething'
process).
249.
See Low & MATroo, supra note 9, at 25; see also GATS, supra note 8,
art. XXIII (regarding dispute resolution).
250.
See discussion infra Part VI.D.4.
251.
See Sussman & Lent, supra note 193, at 28-30.
252.
See id.
253.
See ABA Meeting, supra note 93, at 387; IPO of Polish Monopoly, supra
note 65, at 738.
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begin government-subsidized
research and development
programs. 25 4
National research and development programs
decrease reliance on TNC information and technology and will
improve a transition country's international standing as a
telecommunications service provider.
VII. CONCLUSION

Privatization of telecommunications sectors in Eastern
European countries can be seen as an immediate and direct way
of generating a large infusion of foreign currency into the national
economy. 25 5 Telecommunications improvements act as a catalyst
to other sectors of the economy, improving Poland's overall international competitiveness. The telecommunications provisions of
the GATS agreement provide a certain degree of uniformity to
telecommunications regulations, while offering governments of
transition countries a way to commit to liberalization. This commitment increases foreign capital inflows, as the risk of investing
in the infrastructures of transition countries decreases by a
country's promise to privatize in compliance with GATS. 25 6

Polish lawmakers are currently working on a new Polish
telecommunications law, scheduled to take effect in January
2001.257

These reforms will increase Polish uniformity with

international telecommunications laws. Poland also plans to
eventually become a part of the European Union,25 8 further
binding Poland to private, capitalist regimes. 25 9 Although these
commitments symbolize Polish interest in decreasing control over
telecommunications providers, domestic telecommunications
laws may need to be more narrowly tailored in order to establish
freer market access.
Polish telecom firms need foreign
investment and technology to learn to compete on an
international level.
Improving Polish infrastructure and
privatizing the telecommunications sector will eventually decrease
Polish dependence on TNCs, as Polish firms establish themselves
as technologically-advanced providers. Then Poland will be able

254.
See CABLE & DISTLER, supranote 205, at 36.
255.
See ABA Meeting, supranote 93, at 387.
256.
See Low & MArrOo, supranote 9, at 28.
257.
See CabinetAdopts, supra note 107, at 617.
258.
For
discussion
of
specific
European
Union
policies
on
telecommunications, see generally OLIVER STEHMANN, NETWORK COMPETITION FOR
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 257-310 (1995) and Stephanie L. Harkness, Note,
InternationalPartnershipsin the European Union Telephone Service Market: Towards
a New Monopoly?, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 187 (winter 1996).
259.
Poland plans to enter the European Union by 2008. See Cabinet
Adopts, supranote 107, at 617.
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